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Abstract. The use of an auction to sell residential real estate in the United States is often 
associated with distressed sales such as foreclosure, bankruptcy or estate settlement. In 
other areas of the world, auctions are more commonly used and viewed as a viable, 
preferred method of selling a house. This article uses hedonic pricing methodology to 
compare the sale prices of houses in Christchurch, New Zealand sold at auction with 
those sold by private treaty. The results indicate that in some cases auctions can res ult 
in premium sale prices. In none of the cases studied did auctions result in lower prices 
than private-treaty sales. 
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Introduction 
In Australia and New Zealand, an auction of real property is viewed as a desirable 
and viable alternative to utilizing the services of a real estate broker (private-treaty 
sale). Both buyer and seller are willing participants and view their marketing 
alternatives with substitutability. Therefore, the auction process and circumstances 
surrounding the sale are both viewed as rendering "fair market value." Consequently, 
these markets offer researchers opportunities to compare sales prices obtained from 
the two marketing choices. 
In contrast, auctions of real estate in the United States are most frequently the result 
of: mortgage foreclosure, tax foreclosure, divorce settlement and estate settlement. 
These are events associated with owners being under duress or order to sell or transfer 
title to a third party. Therefore, the circumstances surrounding sale by auction are not 
comparable to a sell by real estate broker; sales prices often occur at a perceived 
discount to fair market value. It is difficult to determine to what extent the perceived 
discount is the result of differences in seller motivation, the dynamics of the auction 
process or whether auction property as a class are deficient or substandard.1 
Because of these differences, the U.S. market does not offer good opportunities to 
compare pricing by auction and the private-treaty sale. 
The purpose of this study is to compare the performance of auctions and private- 
treaty sales of residential real estate in Christchurch, New Zealand. Research findings 
by Lusht (1990, 1996) and Newell, MacFarlane, Lusht and Bulloch (1993) in Sydney, 
 
 
 
 
Australia support the presence of a sales advantage to auctions of 3%-15%. This 
study extends this research for a different market and time period, tests for sample 
selection bias and further examines the interaction of property area in the city and 
sale by private-treaty or auction with regard to market price. 
Theory of Auctions 
Academic literature has an abundance of theoretical articles relating to auctions. Some 
of the comprehensive investigations of auction theory include Wilson (1977, 1992), 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1980), Milgrom and Weber (1982), McAfee and McMillan 
(1987) and Milgrom (1989). These studies have focused on several issues, including: 
(1) the expected revenue to the seller from various auction methods; (2) the impact 
of information on bidding; (3) how the number of active bidders influences the final 
sales price; (4) the impact of risk aversion among bidders; and (5) strategies for 
setting a reserve price. In general, research suggests the use of auctions as 
preferable to private negotiations for selling high-quality, relatively homogeneous 
properties (Wilson, 1977). 
The decision to sell at auction or through private treaty relates to whether the auction 
maximizes the seller's expected profit. Research indicates that by setting a reserve 
price, and under a reasonable set of general conditions, auctions are an optimal 
method of sale (Harris and Raviv, 1981; and McAfee and McMillan, 1988). McAfee 
and McMillan (1987) cite the ability of an auction to extract a commitment from 
the seller; the seller cannot renege on a sale price, which reduces indeterminacy for 
the buyer. 
Auctions are beneficial to sellers who desire a quicker sale in contrast to a protracted 
process of finding the right buyer through a private-treaty sale. Ashenfelter (1989) 
has written that an auction system permits an uninformed seller to obtain the 
approximate market value for items they own. In a competitive market with many 
buyers and sellers, all who are price takers and have perfect information, the object 
will sell at a price that yields a normal profit and reflects the "true value" of the 
object, and would sell at a price that would be very similar to other houses of similar 
size and quality. 
Milgrom and Weber (1982), in an excellent survey of auction literature, describe four 
major types of auction sales methods including the English auction, the first-price 
sealed-bid auction, the second-price sealed-bid auction and the Dutch auction. The 
English auction has bids that are progressive, ascending, open and oral. In a first-price 
sealed-bid auction, the buyer has claim to the object auctioned by making the highest 
bid. The second-price sealed-bid auction also makes claim to the object auctioned by 
making the highest bid, but only pays the amount of the second highest bid. Because 
buyers may place higher bids than in a first-price auction, the seller does not 
necessarily receive a lower price. In a Dutch auction, the auctioneer announces 
prices in descending order. Auctions of real estate in New Zealand and 
Australia are 
 
 
 
conducted by means of English auction. Neither the second-sealed bid nor the Dutch 
auction, however, are used for auctioning real estate. 
Real Estate Auctions 
Maher (1989) describes the significant change in the proportion of auction versus 
private-treaty sales from 1959-86 in Melbourne, Australia. His research indicates that 
the real estate industry has exerted influence to effect a movement towards sale by 
auction; the purported reason given by industry representatives is for greater 
professionalism among real estate agents and to achieve a better means of 
determining a true and fair price for property. Maher suggests that auction sales 
benefit the real estate industry, yet place the buyer at a clear disadvantage. The 
industry claim of a higher relative sales price for properties sold at auction in 
comparison to private-treaty sale, Maher notes, has not been demonstrated, and he 
therefore calls for research into the pricing question. 
Lusht (1990) compared the sales price of houses sold at auction with those sold by 
private treaty in Melbourne, Australia. He found that properties sold by private treaty 
sold for 5.6% less than similar homes sold at auction. The results also indicated that 
the auction premium existed only for houses with high levels of "market interest," 
while no sale-price differential was observed for houses with low levels of market 
interest. Lusht's data included only homes in the upper price ranges and all were sold 
by the same real estate company. 
Newell, MacFarlane, Lusht and Bulloch (1993) studied the housing market in Sydney, 
Australia. The authors observed that the median sales price of auctioned properties 
was 3.6% higher than the median sales price of properties sold by private treaty. This 
observed "premium" was less than the 6.5% measured by Lusht. The lower premium 
compared to Lusht was attributed to market conditions at the time of the sample, 
however, this study's average price results were not adjusted for quality differences. 
A recent study by Lusht (1996) compares the sales prices of house sales brought by 
163 auctions to prices from 80 private-treaty sales in Melbourne, Australia for the 
fifteen-month period beginning January 1988. His results produce no evidence of 
selection bias, and therefore, he applies ordinary least squares regression. The findings 
indicate that auctions produced about an 8% price premium when evaluated at the 
mean. A potential problem with the sample obtained for this study is that it consists 
of only high-middle to high-priced homes located in a specific market area, 
therefore, the price differential would be biased if the percentage selling price 
differential varies by area or home value. 
Based on the aforementioned studies of auctions, we test the following hypotheses: 
 
 
 
 
 
How the Auction Works 
The properties analyzed in this study were sold by brokers who offer both auction 
and private-treaty sales services. The broker may encourage an auction if the owner 
is "motivated" to sell the property, willing to accept a price that the auction bidders 
will offer. A seller who chooses a private-treaty sale usually pays a commission of 
3.5%-4%. A seller who chooses auction pays the same sales commission rate, but 
also pays an advance marketing fee ranging between $NZ1,000 and $NZ2,000. 
Individual companies may reimburse sellers for unused advertising. Some private- 
treaty sellers are also invited to supplement the advertising budget above that 
contained in the commission rate. The concept of charging auction sellers the same 
commission rate and a higher fee for advertising is used in the U. S. as well. Sellers 
who choose the auction are willing to pay the higher fees for the following reasons: 
(1) the extra advertising may expose the property to more potential buyers, increasing 
the chance that the high value buyer will become aware of the property; and (2) the 
auction often results in a quicker closing date, which reduces the owners' holding 
costs. A seller may accept a lower price at auction because of the reduced holding 
costs due to the quick closing of the transaction.2 
A New Zealand property listed for auction will typically be heavily advertised for 
three to four weeks prior to the auction. During this period, potential buyers are shown 
the property and are encouraged to make offers. However, the owner is advised not 
to make a counter-offer, because this would effectively place a ceiling on the bidding 
at the auction. The seller's reservation price (or right of refusal price) is often not  
disclosed to the auctioneer until the day of the auction, and sometimes not until the 
bidding has reached its maximum. At this time, the auctioneer may halt the bidding 
to consult with the owner to determine if the property will be sold. The auctioneer 
can make "seller" bids on the owner's behalf as many times as he feels prudent, but 
usually only before the auction reaches the seller's reservation price. The winning 
bidder must present a check for 10%-20% of the purchase price on the day of the 
auction. 
Data 
Sales information from Christchurch, New Zealand was gathered to test the research 
hypotheses. A federal government agency known as Valuation New Zealand (VNZ) 
maintains a database of all real estate transactions that occur in the country. VNZ is 
responsible for the ad valorem assessment of property values for general property 
taxes. Information from VNZ was combined with Multiple Listing Service data and 
primary research of newspaper archives to create the data set for statistical analysis.  
The first step in the data gathering process was to identify all houses that were sold 
by auction in the Christchurch area during the time period from September 1991  
 
 
 
through December 1992. Library research was done to discover every house that was 
advertised to be auctioned during this time period. In addition, five local brokers who 
are active in the auction business were interviewed; and they supplied lists of all the 
properties that they had recently sold by auction. Sales data were used to confirm 
whether or not the advertised properties actually sold on or before the auction date. 
Consequently, the data set contains virtually all properties sold at auction in the 
Christchurch area during the time period considered. The next step was to identify 
which areas of Christchurch had the most auction activity, to determine whether the 
auction sales were uniformly distributed geographically. This analysis revealed that 
four areas of the city contained the majority of auction transactions. These areas of 
town are broadly referred to as "Northwest Christchurch," the "Hills," "St Albans" 
and the "Shirley" area. The Northwest area includes stately, well-kept older homes 
nearest the city center, and also contains newer homes that are built closer to the 
suburban fringe. This area is the most expensive with a mean home price of 
approximately $NZ200,000. The Hills area contains many high-priced homes built on 
the foothills of east suburban Christchurch that may have magnificent views of either 
Christchurch and the mountains to the west, or views of the ocean to the east. The 
mean price of these homes is only about 5% less than the Northwest area, therefore, 
these areas are comparably priced. St. Albans and Shirley areas consist of moderately 
priced urban areas located in north and east Christchurch respectively. Homes in St. 
Albans sell for approximately one-third less than the Northwest area, while Shirley 
area homes sell for about one-half the price of Northwest area homes. As expected, 
homes in the Northwest and Hills areas have a greater proportion of homes with 
quality fixtures and construction than homes in the St. Albans and Shirley areas.  
The data set contains all properties sold by auction and private-treaty during the 
sixteen-month period from September 1991 through December 1992 in the Northwest, 
Hill, St Albans and Shirley areas. The complete data set contains 5,344 residential 
transactions including 158 auction sales. 
Methodology 
A hedonic pricing model was created to test the above hypotheses. The model was 
specified as: 
 
 
 
 
A possible problem associated with empirical tests Equation (1) concerns sample 
selection bias (see Haurin and Hendershott, 1991; and Jud and Seaks, 1994). Sample 
selection occurs, for example, if individuals self-select a particular treatment such as 
selling a property by auction or by private treaty.  
That is, the selling price of a property cannot be observed using the alternative 
marketing choice. If the marketing choice is correlated with omitted pricing variables, 
then the price differential may be attributable to the marketing mechanism. Because 
the conditional expectation is that the error terms will not equal zero, coefficients 
suffer from a selectivity bias. One solution to this problem is the two-stage Heckman 
(1979) procedure of first estimating a profit equation to explain marketing choice, and 
then applying a regression including a selectivity variable estimated from the first -
stage).5 
Empirical Results 
The descriptive statistics presented in Exhibit 1 show the means for the entire sample 
and auctioned properties. These statistics show that the average sales price for the 
group of auctioned properties was higher than private-treaty properties. Auctioned 
properties were larger, had more land, were older and more likely to have premium 
materials and architecture. Taking the antilogs of the sales prices in Exhibit 1 indicates 
a difference of approximately $NZ50,000. The auction transactions represent 
approximately 3% of the total market volume in these areas during the time period 
of this study. The dummy variables for the four areas indicate the first three areas 
represent between 26% and 31% of the sample, while Area 4 represents about 17%. 
 
 
 
Probit Results 
The probit selection model results are shown in Exhibit 2. This model has a dependent 
variable of whether a property is auctioned (zi = 1) or sold by private treaty (zi = 0) 
and three continuous variables as well as fifteen time dummy (TDi) variables. From 
 
 
 
previous research, auctioned properties appear to be higher priced and more unique. 
Therefore, continuous variables to measure these characteristics include the natural 
log of house size, the binary variable of premium quality of property 
improvements as evaluated by VNZ staff and quality of wall condition. Time dummy 
variables hold constant extraneous market influences that might prompt sellers in 
any given month to choose one method of sale versus another. 
The probit model results in Exhibit 2 indicate a statistically significant log-likelihood 
value for restricted slopes; this is evidenced by a x2 = 157.53. A Lagrange Multiplier 
(LM) test for homoskedasticity reveals a large LM, therefore, a correction procedure 
is conducted which corrects the standard errors and t-values.6 However, all continuous 
variables and most time dummy variables are statistically significant. As anticipated, 
more expensive properties and those with higher quality fittings and fixtures are more 
likely to sell by auction. The time dummy variables indicate the probability of sale 
appears to be cyclical; months following September 1991 are all positive, with the 
probability of an auction sale relative to private-treaty sale becoming stronger into the 
following year. This trend is consistent with anecdotal evidence that brokers are 
increasingly prompting potential sellers to sell by auction. Interest rates were declining 
fairly consistently each month from 11.8% in September 1991 to 8.9% by December 
1992 to 8.9% by December 1992.7 
 
 
 
Sample Selection Regression Results 
The sample selection equations are shown in Exhibit 3 for the private treaty and 
auction samples.8 For the private treaty and auction samples, the adjusted R2 are 64% 
and 69%, respectively. Perhaps the most important aspect in Exhibit 3 relates to A; 
the null hypothesis is that A(y' w) is zero or that sample selection bias is nonexistent. 
The low t-value for both samples (-0.9) for the private-treaty sample and —0.8 for 
the auction sample) indicates failure to reject the null hypothesis with a good degree 
of confidence. Therefore, a regression estimation without sample selection bias 
correction is appropriate.9 
Regression Pricing Results 
Exhibit 4 reports the generalized least squares results (GLS) for the entire sample 
with values for the auction variable. Both GLS regressions reported in this exhibit 
have statistically significant F-values and good adjusted Res of 79%. The x2 of the 
Breusch and Pagan (1979) Lagrange Multiplier test indicates a heteroskedasticity 
problem in the data. The White (1980) procedure was applied to obtain the true 
variance for the least squares estimator. In Exhibit 4, GLS Regression 1 assumes a 
common dummy variable for all areas, while GLS Regression 2 permits separate 
estimates for auction by area. 
Exhibit 4 reports the important pricing effects of a sale by auction versus by private 
treaty.10
°
 The Auction variable in Regression 1 is approximately 1.8%, which suggests 
 
 
 
that the pricing differential between auction sales and private-treaty sales of houses 
is not statistically significant. The results in Regression 2 are somewhat more 
enlightening, however, as the interaction of the Area variables with the Auction 
variable produces different effects of an auction sale for the four areas. Only the 
Area 3 (Shirley) parameter is negative, however, it is not statistically significant. The 
other lower-priced area is St. Albans (Area 2), and the regression parameter is 
not statistically significant. The two highest-priced areas, Area 1 (Northwest) and Area 
4 (Hills), are statistically significant. These parameters convert to a pricing 
difference of 5.9% and 9.5 %, respectively, relative to private-treaty sales prices. The 
parameters for the various areas produce changes in sales price relative to the 
Northwest area (Area 1) which are consistent with those reported in Exhibit 1, 
however, they are adjusted for the other variables in the regression. The sales price 
for homes in Area 4, for example, is about 2.4% lower than Area 1. These findings 
suggest the need to examine sales price effects of auction versus private-treaty 
sales carefully; an aggregated approach may not capture it. 
 
 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
This study is based upon a sample of over 5,344 sales in the Christchurch, New 
Zealand. The results show that auction volume was heaviest in four major 
geographical areas of the community. In these areas, 3% of the properties were sold 
at auction. A probit model reveals that the probability of an auction sale versus private- 
treaty sale is strongly influenced by house size, quality, and condition. The probability 
of an auction sale increased from September 1991 through December 1992, which 
was during a period of declining interest rates. In two of the four areas, no difference 
was observed between the sales price of properties sold at auction and similar 
properties sold by private treaty. In Area 1 and Area 4, which include highly priced, 
unique and desirable homes, a premium was observed for those that sold at auction. 
This premium ranged from 5.9% to 9.5%. These results are consistent with the results 
of previous research done in Melbourne, Australia. Even with higher marketing fees 
of $NZ1,000 to $NZ2,000, the net amount received by the seller is still more under 
auction for higher-priced, more unique properties. 
The results indicate that auctions are most successful for unique, desirable houses in 
the higher price ranges. Uninformed bidders may overbid for such properties because 
they are unaware of the prices and/or availability of other properties that have sold 
in the same area. It is also possible that an informed buyer may overbid for the 
property and purchase it at a price higher than their estimate of the true value. This 
would be more likely to occur in the higher priced houses purchased by wealthy 
individuals who have less financial constraints and can afford to pay more than they 
know they should simply because they want to have the property. An informed buyer 
may also unintentionally overbid for a unique property because sales evidence on 
comparables is scant or nonexistent. In the absence of a distribution of property prices 
for comparable unique houses, the informed buyer must estimate the true value based 
on inadequate pricing information; the estimate is likely to deviate substantially from 
the true value. The auction process, however, assists in the dissemination of valuable 
pricing information to potential bidders. 
It is also interesting to note that no premium or discount for auctions occurred in the 
other two areas of Christchurch. Even in areas where sales prices are below average, 
no discount was incurred by property owners who elected to sell by auction. These 
results are consistent with French and McCormick (1984), who suggest that a seller 
is more likely to choose a negotiated sale over an auction when there is not much 
dispersion in the true value of the asset across the potential buyers, or if the owner 
can identify the highest valued user in advance. In the more moderate price ranges, 
there is more market activity, more comparable sales information and more close 
substitutes. Hence, risk-averse bidders may feel less pressure to win the auction; 
because if they do not, it is likely that another similar house is for sale or soon will 
be. 
Auctions are being used regularly in several areas of the world to sell residential real 
property. The results of this study indicate that auctions can be an effective way to 
market and sell residential properties. In Christchurch, New Zealand, some owners 
 
 
 
are selecting the auction method as the preferred method of selling their house. The results of this 
research suggest that they are making a good choice.  
Notes 
1 Research by Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992), Vanderporten (1992), Deboer, Conrad and 
McNamara (1992) and Mayer (1993) examines real estate auctions in the U.S.  
2 In the U.S., the auction rules may demand a 20% downpayment in cash on the day of the auction, 
with the remainder due in cash at closing within seven days. This compares favorably to the 30-45 
days required to close a sale by private treaty. Buyers are usually qualified prior to the auction and 
must have a letter of credit or check for the downpayment.  
3 The number of bathrooms is another variable that is often incorporated in hedonic pricing models 
for single-family houses. However, many houses in Christchurch have only one bathroom. Only 
in the recent years has it become more common to build houses with more than one bathroom. 
4 Properties were classified as sold by auction if they sold under one of the following three 
circumstances: (1) they sold the day of the auction; (2) they sold prior to the auction; or (3) they 
sold within a week after the advertised auction date. Interviews with the brokers most actively 
involved in auctions revealed that an auction can lead to a sale of the property prior to the sale or 
immediately after an auction occurs. The phenomenon of auction selling differs from conventional 
agency listing (private treaty) in at least one important aspect. The asking price is known in a 
private-treaty sale, but not so in the auction process. While the intentions of potential auction 
buyers are canvassed by the vendor's agents prior to the auction day, at no time are the buyers aware of 
an exact price. It is part of the skill of the listing broker to persuade buyers that individually they 
stand a good chance of being the successful bidder, given that final selling price will not be 
determined until the auction. This encourages the participation of more bidders at the auction, which 
is encouraged by the vendor because it can help to create a sense of urgency amongst the serious 
bidders. When a house sells before auction day, the same circumstance is present. Auctions are 
often advertised with the inclusion "unless sold by private treaty beforehand." So the purchaser who 
offers an amount in this manner, before auction day, does not know what figure the vendor had in 
mind. Most auctioneers are very careful not to disclose any of the vendor's thoughts at this stage, 
and the vendor does not counter offer, because that then puts a ceiling on the eventual selling price. 
Sometimes properties do not sell immediately on the fall of the hammer, but within a few days after 
the day of the auction. Consequently, properties that sold prior to or immediately after the advertised 
auction date, were classified as having been sold at auction along with the properties that were sold 
on auction day. 
5 More formally, if a selection variable z* is not observed but determines whether a property is sold 
by auction or private treaty, estimates of least squares coefficients will be biased (Greene, 1993). 
However, the sign of z* can be inferred even through the magnitude cannot. If a property is 
auctioned, z* > 0, while z* 0 if the property is sold by private treaty. A probit model can be 
utilized to estimate the probability of an auction or private-treaty sale as follows (Greene, 1993:710): 
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